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This exploration of sovereignty, territoriality, and the rule of law
takes as its point of departure the November 13, 2001, Military Order
issued by President George W. Bush.1 In the Order, the President
claims power as Commander in Chief to detain indefinitely and, if he
chooses, to try, by ad hoc military commissions, persons designated
by him as international terrorists. Although the Order has no explicit
geography, its implementation has taken on significant territorial
aspects. As events unfold on Guantdnamo, the operative aspects of
the Order primarily involve an unprecedented program for indefinite
administrative detention without charge or trial. The Order
represents a stunning claim to absolutist power, and a rejection of any
meaningful legal constraints on the treatment of the captives. The
Order repudiates the fundamental principle of judicial control over
executive detention, which dates back to the Magna Carta. The Bush
Administration policy reflects a realist view of international law, and
poses a significant challenge to the international community and its
efforts to establish human rights principles governing detentions
during states of emergency.
The Order can be approached from a variety of legal and policy
perspectives. I have chosen to examine its implications concerning
the relationships among sovereignty, territoriality, and the rule of law.
Why does the Order pursue a highly problematic armed conflict
alternative to the criminal law paradigm, which is readily available to
* Jeffrey & Susan Brotman Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1. Military Order of November 13, 2001, "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism," 66 Fed. Reg. 57833-57836
(Nov. 16,2001).
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combat terrorist acts and threats? Can international law
accommodate the notion of an "inter-national" armed conflict
between a state and a transnational criminal network that controls no
territory and eschews territorial ambitions? Which principles of
international humanitarian law apply? If the "War Against
Terrorism" is a new type of global and possibly permanent armed
conflict, does it have the same impact on the Constitution as
conventional armed conflicts? Who are the "alien enemies" in this
conflict, and how are their constitutional rights affected? If
humanitarian law and the Constitution do not function as constraints
on executive power, is international human rights law nevertheless
available to protect the Guantdnamo captives? Are universal rights
adaptable situationally but constant geographically? If the President
may act extraterritorially and Congress may criminalize
extraterritorial conduct, why should the judiciary be disabled from
extending the rule of law to persons subjected to extraterritorial
detention and trial?
The Order exploits the confused state of contemporary
sovereignty. Indeed, the policy regarding the Guantdnamo captives is
a case study in the "organized hypocrisy" analyzed by Stephen
Krasner.2 The Order and the "War Against Terrorism" on which it is
premised challenge the most commonly accepted principles of post-
Westphalian sovereignty: exclusive control over territory, non-
interference, and equality among states. The Order expresses an
anachronistic claim to sovereignty as absolute rule without
accountability. Ironically, the contemporary sovereign finds scope for
absolutism more easily outside his territorial realm than within it.
The legal premise for the Military Order is the asserted existence
of a "state of armed conflict." This claim is of pivotal importance,
and not a legal technicality. Without a cognizable armed conflict, the
President's attempt to create a parallel and extraconstitutional
criminal justice system would be rejected out of hand by all but the
most extreme authoritarians. The Bush Administration relies by
historical analogy upon military commissions that tried alien enemy
combatants during declared wars with other states, commissions
established by the United States as an occupying power in foreign
states, and martial law commissions that tried persons during internal
armed conflict in the United States? The United States has not
2. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999).
3. The historical precedents are discussed infra in Section III.A.
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previously relied upon ad hoc military tribunals to try terrorist
suspects, nor has it indefinitely detained terrorist suspects without
charge or trial. These measures are highly dubious both under the
Constitution and international law.
The international terrorist threat is of long standing. The United
Nations has drafted a dozen treaties on the subject of international
terrorism, and various acts such as aircraft hijacking and attacks upon
diplomats are regarded as international crimes.4 Al Qaeda had
previously launched significant attacks upon symbols of U.S.
sovereignty abroad, notably the 1996 bombings of the U.S. embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania that cost hundreds of lives and the 2000 attack
upon the USS Cole in Yemeni waters! But not until Al Qaeda's
murderous September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon did the U.S. government embrace the concept of a "war"
with Al Qaeda.6  The September 11 attacks had a profound
psychological impact upon the American public, disposing it to accept
the rhetoric of armed conflict and the reality of a sizable military
response, as well as a significant alteration in security consciousness
and governmental operations. The devastation of home ground
seemed all the worse for having been inflicted by innocuous and non-
military instruments-box-cutters and civilian aircraft-and by
persons who did not resemble invaders but ordinary visitors.
The November 13 Order does not characterize the "armed
conflict" on which it rests, and specifies neither its parties nor its
duration. The confusion and contradictions in the characterization of
the claimed armed conflict became especially apparent in the
controversy surrounding the Guantdnamo captives' status as
prisoners of war. This confusion was not dispelled by the cynical
4. The U.N. treaties include the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offenses and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219,
20 U.S.T. 2941; the 1970 Hague Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure
of Aircraft (Hijacking), Dec. 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, 22 U.S.T. 1641; the 1971
Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation (Sabotage), Sept. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, 24 U.S.T. 565; the 1973
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 28, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167,28
U.S.T. 1975; and the 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,
Dec. 17, 1979,1316 U.N.T.S. 205, T.I.A.S. 11,081.
5. Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law: Legal Regulation of the Use of Force: Terrorist Attacks on the
World Trade Center and Pentagon, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 237, 239-41 (2002).
6. Id. at 242.
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determination by the President that certain captives were covered by,
but derived no rights from, the Geneva Conventions of 1949.'
It remains unclear whether the asserted war is to be regarded as
an international armed conflict against all international terrorists; an
international armed conflict against Al Qaeda; an international
armed conflict against the former de facto Taliban regime in
Afghanistan; or the long-standing internal armed conflict in
Afghanistan, which appears to have been resolved with the
establishment of an interim government in December 2001.8 These
various scenarios implicate dramatically different international legal
regimes. Indeed, the idea of an international armed conflict between
a state and transnational criminal networks cannot be accommodated
by accepted concepts of sovereignty, which adhere only to
territorially defined states. The refusal to provide a clear
characterization of the "armed conflict" on which the Order is
premised appears to be a strategy to escape the application of
constraining legal norms and to preserve flexibility to subject persons
to the Order without temporal or geographic limits.
This essay will explore what the Order and the Bush
Administration's actions pursuant to it reflect about perceptions of
sovereignty, the linkage or disconnection between sovereignty and
territoriality, and the consequences for the rule of law. The Bush
Administration believes that it has found on Guantdnamo a "rights-
free zone," and it will request that U.S. courts ratify this theory.'
Because the treatment of the captives also implicates important
international legal norms (specifically, consular access, humanitarian
law for those captured during combat, and human rights law), the
Bush Administration and the international community are engaged in
an active dialogue concerning the Order. While confusion presently
reigns, the Guantdnamo episode may ultimately produce important
clarifications of contemporary doctrines of sovereignty.
7. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at
Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002), available at
http:lwww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html (last visited Sept.
6, 2002) [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
8. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous
War on Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 345, 349-50 (2002).
9. Harold Koh discussed Guantdnamo as a "rights-free zone" in relation to an
earlier U.S. policy regarding interdicted asylum-seekers. Harold Hongju Koh,
America's Offshore Refugee Camps, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 139, 140-41 (1994). See also
Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337
(2002).
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I. Territorial Aspects of Sovereignty
The modern system of international law is commonly claimed to
rest upon an order traceable to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648.10
According to Hans Morgenthau, "the Treaty of Westphalia... made
the territorial state the cornerstone of the modem state system."'"
Daniel Philpott defines sovereignty as "supreme legitimate authority
within a territory."12  Mark W. Zacher traces the emergence of
territoriality as a defining aspect of political entities:
Political life has not always disclosed a clearly defined system of
international boundaries. The medieval world did not have
international boundaries, as we understand them today; authority
over territorial spaces was overlapping and shifting. The political
change from the medieval to the modern world involved the
construction of the delimited territorial state with exclusive
authority over its domain. Even at that, precisely surveyed national
borders only came into clear view in the eighteenth century. In the
words of Hedley Bull, the practice of establishing international
boundaries emerged in the eighteenth century as 'a basic rule of co-
existence."
John Gerard Ruggie contrasts modern concepts of territoriality
with the "nonexclusive territorial rule" characteristic of medieval
Europe.'4 He notes:
[T]he spatial extension of the medieval system of rule was
structured by a nonexclusive form of territoriality, in which
authority was both personalized and parcelized within and across
territorial formations and for which inclusive bases of legitimation
prevailed. The notion of firm boundary lines between the major
10. Andreas Osiander's interesting revisionist view is that the Peace of
Westphalia had the more limited effect of adjusting power relations within the Holy
Roman Empire and between it and certain other states, and that the "myth of
Westphalia" derives from seventeenth century war propaganda by France and
Sweden, appropriated by nineteenth and twentieth century theorists of sovereignty.
Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Myth of Westphalia,
55 INT'L ORG. 251 (2001).
11. HANS J. MORGENTHAU & KENNETH W. THOMPSON, POLITICS AMONG
NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 294 (6th ed. 1985).
12. Daniel Philpott, On the Cusp of Sovereignty: Lessons from the Sixteenth
Century, in SOVEREIGNTY AT THE CROSSROADS? MORALITY AND INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 37,39 (Luis E. Lugo ed., 1996).
13. Mark W. Zacher, The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries
and the Use of Force, 55 INT'L ORG. 215, 216 (2001) (citations omitted).
14. John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in
International Relations, 47 INT'L ORG. 139, 149 (1993).
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territorial formations did not take hold until the thirteenth century;
prior to that date, there were only 'frontiers,' or large zones of
transition. The medieval ruling class was mobile in a manner not
dreamed of since, able to assume governance from one end of the
continent to the other without hesitation or difficulty because the
'public territories formed a continuum with private estates."15
Ruggie observes that "the distinctive feature of the modern system of
rule" is its conferral of authority on "territorially defined, fixed, and
mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate dominion." 6 As such, "it
appears to be unique in human history."'7 And, as will be noted
below, the modern system poses difficulties "for dealing with the
problems of that society that could not be reduced to territorial
solution,"" of which transnational terrorism is the most acute current
example.
The post-Westphalian system is generally believed to have
substituted the territorial state for the civitas dei, the unity of
Christendom under the authority of the Holy Roman Emperor and
the Pope, with ultimate sovereignty in God. Early theorists of
sovereignty, including Bodin and Hobbes, postulated absolute
authority of the territorial sovereign over his subjects." This
atomistic system supposedly displaced complex concepts of layered
sovereignty and interpenetration of authority. However, matters
were never as simple as the common understanding of Westphalia
would suggest, and treaty protections for religious minorities are an
early model for contracted and imposed limitations on the sovereign's
treatment of its subjects.'
Seyom Brown claims that two "Westphalian principles" in
particular "constitute the normative core of international law: (1) the
government of each country is unequivocally sovereign within its
territorial jurisdiction, and (2) countries shall not interfere in each
other's domestic affairs.",2' Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter
prohibits the use or threat of force in international relations when
15. Id. at 150 (citations omitted).
16. Id. at 151.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 164.
19. Philpott, supra note 12, at 39-40; ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE
BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 4-5 (Paul Wilkinson ed., 1986).
20. KRASNER, supra note 2, at 73-104.
21. SEYOM BROWN, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN A CHANGING GLOBAL
SYSTEM: TOWARD A THEORY OF THE WORLD POLITY 74 (1992).
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undertaken "against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state."' This privileging of territorial integrity in the Charter
regime is reflected in the virtual disappearance of successful wars of
territorial aggrandizement.3 The norm's centrality poses a deep
dilemma for the United Nations itself in the aftermath of the Kosovo
crisis, as the Security Council has authorized United Nations
governance of the province while continuing to recognize formal
Yugoslav sovereignty.24
International law treats states, exercising authority over defined
territories, as the constituent units of the international system (for
example, in relation to the power to ratify treaties), and postulates a
formal equality among states that is belied by actual disparities in
power and influence." Only in the latter half of the twentieth century
was the legal authority of territorial states extended throughout the
globe.26 The post-Westphalian system coexisted with colonial empires
for several centuries, during which the privileges of sovereignty in the
international legal system were reserved primarily to European states
and to certain others satisfying a test of civilization.
Guantdnamo itself occupies an anomalous position stemming
from colonialism and reflecting enduring power asymmetries.7 The
lease agreement states:
While on the one hand the United States recognizes the
continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba
over the above described areas of land and water, on the other
hand the Republic of Cuba consents that during the period of
occupation by the United States of said areas under the terms of
22. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
23. Zacher, supra note 13 (providing striking empirical data and noting the
importance of the norm of territorial integrity to weak states emerging from the
decolonization process).
24. See Hansj6rg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System:
The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 Avl. J. INT'L L. 46 (2001).
25. The Principles of the United Nations Charter give priority of place to the
"principle of the sovereign equality of all of its Members." U.N. CHARTER art. 2(1).
26. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD (1990).
27. The United States gained control of Guantdnamo as a condition of
withdrawing its troops from the occupation of Cuba following the Spanish American
War, and the terms of the lease do not permit successor Cuban governments to
terminate the U.S. presence without the U.S. consent. KRASNER, supra note 2, at 38;
MICHAEL Ross FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN
STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 91-93
(1995).
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this agreement the United States shall exercise complete
jurisdiction and control over and within said areas.28
The divorce of "ultimate sovereignty" from "complete jurisdiction
and control" clearly would contradict the premises of the post-
Westphalian state system, but for the recognition that the sovereign's
powers include the capacity to alienate portions of territorial control.
Three basic principles can be derived from the U.N. Charter
version of post-Westphalian sovereignty: (1) exclusive authority
within a defined territory; (2) non-interference by states in the
domestic jurisdiction of other states;29 and (3) equality among states.
The threat or use of force in international relations, the former libert
de guerre, was renounced in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, but
subject to the Security Council's collective use of force pursuant to
Chapter VII and the reserved right of self-defense in Article 51. The
"War Against Terrorism" that underlies the November 13 Order is
difficult to reconcile with these precepts of contemporary sovereignty,
and this essay explores some of the conceptual challenges that it
poses and the consequences to international law.
The events of September 11 vividly illustrate that non-state
actors may now shape international relations and affect the conduct
of powerful states more profoundly than many formal members of the
territorial state club. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a territorial
state bold enough to launch such attacks openly upon the territory of
the United States. A state (at least one governed by rational actors)
would anticipate self-defense by massive U.S. military retaliation
pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, resulting in an
international armed conflict leading to defeat and occupation. An
"armed attack" attributable to another state creates the basis for an
exception to the prohibition on the use of force in relations between
states, at least during the period immediately following the attack.
Some uncertainty exists, however, concerning the rules for attributing
responsibility to states for the armed incursions of guerrilla forces
they have supplied or supported, into the territory of other states.'
28. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Cuba
for the Lease (Subject to Terms to be Agreed upon by the Two Governments) to the
United States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-
Cuba, art. III, T.S. No. 418 [hereinafter Coaling and Naval Stations Lease].
29. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
30. The International Court of Justice rejected claims that the United States
could lawfully undertake military action (as a form of collective self-defense with El
Salvador) against Nicaragua, in response to alleged Nicaraguan support for the
[Vol. 25:303
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Officials and publics in the West had little difficulty attributing
responsibility for the attacks by Al Qaeda operatives on September
11 to the de facto Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The guilt of the
Taliban is derived from its permission to Al Qaeda to conduct
planning, training, and financing operations within territory the
Taliban controlled. Territorial sovereignty carries with it an
obligation to prevent territory from becoming a staging area for
armed attacks on other states, at least if the sovereign is directing the
attacks or has substantial involvement with the attacking bands."
Notably, Germany and Spain have not been the targets of U.S.
military retaliation post-September 11, even though evidence suggests
that much of the planning and financing for the attacks occurred on
their territory. Some unstated element of intentionality appears to
separate the complicit Taliban from the blameless allies. Tolerance
of terrorist activities that implicate state responsibility is,
unfortunately, not clearly delineated in the International Law
Commission's recently completed Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for internationally wrongful acts. 2
No authorization by the U.N. Security Council is necessary to
authorize the United States and its coalition partners "to bring to
justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist
attacks,"'33 which are international crimes implicating universal
jurisdiction. The use of force in law enforcement is one of the
exclusive powers of the post-Westphalian state. While the exercise of
law enforcement authority outside the territorial limits of the state is
guerrillas in El Salvador, giving a narrow reading to the term "armed attack." Case
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, paras. 183-195 (June 27).
31. The United Nations General Assembly defined as "aggression" the "sending
by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which
carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to
[acts of aggression committed directly by the State], or of its substantial involvement
therein." G.A. Res. 3314, Dec. 14, 1974, 29 U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 29th Sess.,
Supp. No. 31, art. 3(g), at 143, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
32. Draft articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts,
adopted by the International Law Commission at its Fifty-third session (2001),
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third session.
U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001). Draft Article 8
addresses conduct of persons "acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or
control of, [a] State." Id. art. 8. Draft Article 11 establishes state responsibility for
"[c]onduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding articles" but which
"the State acknowledges and adopts ... as its own." Id. art. 11.
33. U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001).
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ordinarily forbidden, the consent of the territorial sovereign restores
legality. The pre-September 11 metaphorical "war against terrorism"
involved arrangements for mutual criminal assistance, including
extradition and the sharing of information among law enforcement
and national security agencies.34
Transnational criminal networks on the model of Al Qaeda
dispense with territoriality as a basis for authority. Unlike many
groups denominated as international terrorist organizations, such as
Basque Fatherland and Liberty ("ETA"), the Kurdistan Workers'
Party ("PKK"), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE"), the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia ("FARC"), and the Abu
Sayyaf Group, Al Qaeda neither aspires to the creation of a separatist
state nor seeks to seize political authority throughout the territory of
an existing state." Separatist, irredentist, and insurgent groups
essentially buy into the territorial state paradigm. Al Qaeda stands
outside it. While it appears that the creation of a territorial
Palestinian state is among the objectives of Al Qaeda, its concepts of
sovereignty and its mode of operation in many respects reject the
post-Westphalian system.
Al Qaeda's identity and operation as a transnational criminal
network would not pose any particular challenge to the international
legal regime had the Bush Administration chosen to treat its acts as
crimes, either domestic or international. The prior, and indeed in
some respects current, policy of the United States was to try Al
Qaeda attacks upon U.S. targets as crimes in federal court.6
The international legal bases for the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction by the United States over the various crimes attributed to
34. In the aftermath of September 11, the European Union responded primarily
by enhancing its arrangements for mutual criminal assistance, specifically
streamlining extradition. European Union, Conclusions and Plan of Action of the
Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001, reprinted in 40
I.L.M. 1264 (2001). Certain member states also contributed troops to the armed
conflict in Afghanistan.
35. For the list of foreign terrorist organizations designated by the U.S. Secretary
of State, see U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, 2001 Report on Foreign Terrorist Organizations (Oct. 5, 2001),
available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/2001/5258.htm (last visited Sept. 17,
2002).
36. At the time of writing in March 2002, three alleged Al Qaeda operatives
(Zacarias Moussaoui, Richard Reid, and John Walker Lindh) awaited trial in federal
district court on charges relating to different aspects of Al Qaeda's activities against
the United States. Their alleged acts occurred both inside and outside the territory of
the United States.
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Al Qaeda reflect a complex attitude toward territoriality in the
definitions of jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to adjudicate.37
International terrorists follow in the steps of pirates in being
perceived as "the enemy of all mankind-hostis humani generis-
whom any nation may in the interest of all capture and punish.... ."'s
While universal jurisdiction over piracy was justified by the fact that
the "scene of the pirate's operations is the high seas, which it is not
the right or duty of any nation to police,"3 international terrorists
threaten the common interests of international society and float
within the territory of many states.
The United States has chosen to abandon the law enforcement
paradigm for an armed conflict theory with respect to the
Guantinamo captives.' The November 13 Order posits a state of
armed conflict between the United States and some unspecified
enemy entity or entities, to which the persons subject to detention
and ad hoc military trial are supposedly linked. The September 11
attacks are treated as an act of war, and the Order suggests that the
military commissions may attempt to conceptualize the September 11
attacks and other terrorist operations as violations of the laws of
war.4" The procedural rules issued by the Department of Defense in
37. There are five bases for jurisdiction to prescribe that are generally considered
to be consistent with international law and the principles of state equality and
independence-territorial, nationality, passive personality, effects, and universal.
Two are essentially territorial, either direct (territorial) or indirect (effects). Effects
jurisdiction is the most controversial, and the United States is widely regarded as
legislating expansively on this basis. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S.
764 (1993); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 415 & reporter's note 3 (1987). Two involve projections of sovereignty
based upon links between the prescribing jurisdiction and persons possessing its
nationality who become either perpetrators (nationality) or victims (passive
personality) of crime outside its territory. The fifth, universal jurisdiction, dispenses
with territoriality in the sense that all states may prosecute an offender who has
committed a crime giving rise to universal jurisdiction, regardless of the location
where the crime was committed and the nationality of the perpetrator and victim.
Some states assert the capacity to exercise universal jurisdiction in absentia.
However, in many treaties the capacity and obligation to exercise universal
jurisdiction are triggered by the physical presence of the alleged perpetrator on the
territory of the prosecuting state.
38. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 70 (Sept. 7) (opinion
of Moore, J.).
39. Id.
40. However, it is possible the Bush Administration will ultimately return to the
law enforcement model by repatriating captives to their states of origin for
prosecution or by transferring some to the ordinary courts in the United States.
41. The Legal Counsel to the President suggested in the press that the Order
20021
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March 2002 are as cryptic as the Order with respect to the substantive
jurisdiction of the commissions, providing that they may try
"violations of the law of war and all other offenses triable by military
commission. 42
This undertheorized "War Against Terrorism" poses serious
conceptual puzzles. For example, the Senate responded to the
September 11 attacks by giving its advice and consent to the
ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings.43 Article 19(2) of the Convention provides:
The activities of the armed forces during an armed conflict, as those
terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which
are governed by that law, are not governed by this Convention, and
the activities undertaken by military forces of a State in the exercise
of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules
of international law, are not governed by this Convention.4
Thus, the Convention is aimed at bombings perpetrated by non-state
actors outside the context of armed conflict-classic acts of terrorism.
The Convention follows the model of other United Nations anti-
terrorism treaties in providing for mutual criminal assistance and
universal jurisdiction with an obligation to prosecute or extradite.
The premise of the November 13 Order is that the September 11
attacks were acts of war and that the perpetrators of those attacks and
other similar terrorist acts or plans should be charged with violations
of the "laws of war." The Bush Administration proposed an
understanding to Article 19(2) of the Convention stating that the
treaty terms "armed conflict" and "international humanitarian law"
should be interpreted to have the "same substantive meaning as the
"covers only foreign enemy war criminals" who will be charged "with offenses
against the international laws of war." Albert R. Gonzales, Martial Justice, Full and
Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,2001, at A27. The text of the Order extends more broadly
and envisions trial for crimes defined by any "applicable laws." Order, supra note 1,
§ 1(e).
42. Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1: Procedures for
Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, Mar. 21,2002, para. 3(B).
43. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A.
Res. 52/164 (1997), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 249 (1998); 147 CONG. REC. S12464 (daily
ed. Dec. 5, 2001). See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States:
International Criminal Law: Conventions on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
and Financing, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 255 (2002).
44. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra
note 43, art. 19(2).
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law of war."4 Acts governed by the law of war are thus not terrorist
acts under the Convention. Yet, the Order appears to be rooted in
the idea that acts of international terrorism violate the laws of war.
The contradictions also emerge from the Bush Administration's
strategy for pursuing the "War Against Terrorism" in various
countries where terrorist groups are believed to operate. Consider
this news item from March 2002:
After deciding to send American soldiers to train antiterrorism
forces in the Philippines, Yemen and Georgia, the Bush
Administration has decided it would be 'counterproductive' to
deploy troops in Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim
nation, because of concerns about an anti-American backlash ....
Instead, White House and Pentagon officials have determined that
the best way to pursue terrorists operating from Indonesia is to
work through law enforcement agencies. To underscore that
policy, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert
S. Mueller III, quietly visited Indonesia last Friday to develop
contacts with his counterparts there.
The decision to rely more on law enforcement efforts and less on
military action is significant because American intelligence officials
believe Indonesia to be a fertile breeding ground for Al Qaeda.
They also believe that the country is the center of operations for a
group that has planned attacks on American targets throughout
Southeast Asia. Three Indonesians were arrested in the Philippines
last week, officials said, and while interrogations are still under
way, the men are thought to be linked to suspected terrorists now
in detention in Malaysia and Singapore.
Policy toward Indonesia has been closely watched around the world
and has been the subject of intense debate within the White House.
The country presents a test case of how the administration handles
the presence of terrorist cells in a nation opposed to American
46military intervention.
45. Murphy, supra note 43, at 257 (quoting Prepared Testimony of William H.
Taft IV, U.S. Department of State Legal Adviser, Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, Oct. 23, 2001). The understanding would exempt from the
exemption certain "isolated acts of violence" committed by insurgent groups,
"consistent with the law of armed conflict." Id. As noted infra note 71, humanitarian
law distinguishes internal armed conflict, which it governs, from isolated acts of
violence that do not create a situation of armed conflict and are thus to be treated as
criminal acts under ordinary law.
46. David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, U.S. Rules Out Training Indonesia Army,
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A test case, indeed. Will those arrested in the Philippines,
Yemen, Georgia, and Indonesia be treated alike as battlefield
detainees, potentially subject to the November 13 Order, like the six
Algerians spirited from Bosnia to Guantdnamo in January 2002?47
And, if this is an international armed conflict and terrorists are
violating the laws of war, why is the consent of the territorial state
required?' But for the November 13 Order, U.S. policy in the "War
Against Terrorism" is uncannily reminiscent of traditional
antiterrorism efforts, which emphasize mutual criminal assistance.
This is perhaps the first "war" in which progress towards victory is
measured by the number of arrests, rather than by territorial
advances against opposing forces.
While international legal scholars puzzle over the implications of
a postulated international armed conflict between the United States
and Al Qaeda, the latter heartily embraces the concept. In his book,
Knights Under the Prophet's Banner, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, theorist
of Al Qaeda and second in command to Osama Bin Laden, discusses
the Jihad of the Muslim "nation" and the reasons why Al Qaeda
decided to declare war upon the United States in 1996."9
"Afghan Arabs" such as Al-Zawahiri, who participated in the
mujahedin struggle against the Soviet-backed Afghan regime and
later made common cause with the Taliban, possess the nationalities
of many different territorial states, not all of them Arab. Al Qaeda
has a physical presence in numerous states, not only in South Asia,
the Middle East, and North Africa, but also in Europe, East Asia, and
North America. It maintains its structure and operations with the
innocuous tools of the globalized world-telephones, e-mail,
videotapes sent to international media, international financial transfer
institutions, and international air travel.
The nation of which Al-Zawahiri writes is not a territorial state,
but a political force connected by faith and commitment to "striving"
but Will Aid Its Antiterror Police, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2002, at A12.
47. See infra note 55.
48. Dexter Filkins, U.S. Might Pursue Qaeda and Taliban to Pakistan Lairs, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at Al (indicating that consent of the government of Pakistan
would be sought prior to pursuit of Al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives in Pakistani
territory).
49. A1-Sharq Al-Awsat Publishes Extracts from Al-Jihad Leader AL-Zawahiri's
New Book, FBIS-NES-2001-1202 (FBIS English translation from Arabic original
published by London-based AI-Sharq al-Awsat) (Dec. 2, 2001), available at
http://www.fas.orgirp/world/paraayman-bk.htm (Sept. 17,2002).
[Vol. 25:303
Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the Rule of Law
(the literal translation of Jihad). Al Qaeda's nation appears to be a
contemporary reconceptualization of the Islamic umma, a sovereignty
under God with layers of authority, symbolically centered on the
caliphate abolished by secular Turkey in 1924.50 While the analogy
risks being overdrawn, the umma of Islam bears some resemblance to
the civitas dei of Christendom that the Westphalian system displaced.
H. Territorial Aspects of Armed Conflict
A. International Armed Conflict
The legal definitions of international armed conflict are
constructed against the background of the post-Westphalian state
system. Thus, Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
envisions international armed conflict between High Contracting
Parties. 1 Only territorial states are capable of ratifying the Geneva
Conventions. The complex rules that govern international armed
conflict-rules that inter alia set out principles of distinction among
targets of warfare and specify treatment of certain classes of persons
affected by conflict, including prisoners of war and civilians-thus
control behavior among states. The Geneva Conventions operate on
the principle of reciprocity, and immunize combatants from both
sides from punishment for lawful acts of war.
Al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist networks are not
capable of becoming High Contracting Parties to the Geneva
Conventions. This is the premise upon which President Bush based
his decision that captives suspected of ties to Al Qaeda, held at
Guantnamo, would not be treated as prisoners of war ("POW")."
The POW policy begs the question whether, for the very reason that
Al Qaeda is not a state, international armed conflict against it is
simply a legal impossibility. The Bush Administration, by denying
the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to its War Against
Terrorism, appears to claim the existence of a new form of
50. For a cogent explanation of theories of pan-Islamism and their relation to
modem state sovereignty, see Sohail H. Hashmi, Pan-Islamism, State Sovereignty,
and International Organization, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY: CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 49-80 (Sohail H. Hashmi ed., 1997).
51. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 2,75 U.N.T.S. 135, 6 U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
52. The press statement, supra note 7, indicates: "Al-Qaida is not a state party to
the Geneva Convention; it is a foreign terrorist group. As such, its members are not
entitled to POW status."
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international armed conflict that is subject to no identifiable norms of
international humanitarian law. For example, persons associated with
the Bush Administration have publicly denied that the principle of
distinction applies to acts of "war" committed by Al Qaeda, so that
even attacks against military targets using conventional methods of
warfare would be subject to criminal punishment. 3  The
Administration's views appear to envision an international armed
conflict in which all of the "combatants" as defined by the Third
Geneva Convention are on one side-that of the United States and
its allies. Obviously, this departs from the principle of reciprocity,
while creating other legal anomalies.
The United States had, prior to November 13, 2001, been
consistent in its rejection of the concept of an international armed
conflict between state and non-state entities. Thus, the United States
has refused to ratify Protocol I of 1977, in part because the Protocol
includes within the definition of international armed conflict wars of
liberation against colonial domination and racist regimes.' Those
wars cling closely to the territorial paradigm, since insurgent groups
aspire to governance and statehood on the post-Westphalian model.
The advantage of Protocol I to insurgents in wars of national
liberation is that much more elaborate and protective rules govern
treatment of combatants in international armed conflict. Insurgents
in internal armed conflict are generally subject to prosecution under
ordinary criminal laws for acts of violence they commit during their
rebellion. An international armed conflict with a transnational
criminal network such as Al Qaeda, with no territorial aspirations, is
not envisioned in Protocol I.
The President's conception of the "War Against Terrorism" is
startlingly broad. A very extensive range of persons suspected of ill
intent against the interests of the United States could potentially find
themselves at the mercy of the ad hoc system of executive justice
established under the November 13 Order. The possible
consequences for fundamental principles of territorial sovereignty are
equally profound. For example, passages in the State of the Union
Address in January 2002 suggest an international armed conflict with
53. Remarks by Professor Ruth Wedgwood, Hearing on Terrorism and Human
Rights, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Washington, D.C., Mar. 11,
2002.
54. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I),
June 8, 1977, art. 1(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
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a wide range of terrorist groups operating in the territories of many
different states, and an intention on the part of the United States to
exercise law enforcement authority where the territorial sovereign
fails to satisfy U.S. requisites:
What we have found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending
there, our war against terror is only beginning....
Thanks to the work of our law enforcement officials and coalition
partners, hundreds of terrorists have been arrested.... These
enemies view the entire world as a battlefield, and we must pursue
them wherever they are....
While the most visible military action is in Afghanistan, America is
acting elsewhere. We now have troops in the Philippines .... Our
soldiers, working with the Bosnian government, seized terrorists
who were plotting to bomb our embassy. Our Navy is patrolling
the coast of Africa to block the shipment of weapons and the
establishment of terrorist camps in Somalia.
My hope is that all nations will heed our call, and eliminate the
terrorist parasites who threaten their countries and our own. ...
But some governments will be timid in the face of terror. And
make no mistake about it: If they do not act, America will."
The November 13 Order is premised upon a claim of
international armed conflict of a legal, and not simply metaphorical,
nature. But this is not an international armed conflict cognizable
under existing international law. The burden remains on the Bush
Administration to enunciate this claim more clearly, and to specify
whether it disclaims the application of customary humanitarian law
along with the Geneva Conventions with respect to its captives.
While the U.S. public appears incurious about the extraordinary
assertion of an international armed conflict between the United
States and terrorist groups, international interlocutors, including the
International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, take a more skeptical and
probing position."
55. The President's State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), available at
http://vww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html (last visited Sept.
17,2002) [hereinafter Union Address].
56. The ICRC argues that the prisoners at Guantdnamo, having been captured
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Indeed, the position of the ICRC suggests a different theory
concerning the armed conflict that serves as the basis for the
November 13 Order. The POW policy asserts the existence of an
international armed conflict between the United States and the
Taliban, the de facto government of Afghanistan at the time the
United States launched its military campaign on Afghan territory in
October 2001. As Afghanistan is a state party to the Geneva
Conventions, Taliban combatants are "covered by the Convention."57
Common Article 2 envisions that some international armed conflicts
will not be declared, and may occur between states that do not
recognize each other's governments. The rules on recognition, which
permit one state to deny the attributes of sovereignty to the effective
government of another state, are in tension with the post-Westphalian
principles of sovereign equality and non-interference." The Geneva
Conventions essentially follow the declaratory rather than
constitutive view of recognition,59 and accommodate the present
reality that formal declarations of war have become virtually
obsolete.
President Bush has nevertheless claimed that all Taliban captives
are ineligible for POW status, without having conducted the
individual hearings mandated by Article 5 of the Third Geneva
Convention for cases where the POW status of a captured combatant
is in question.' This decision is designed to leave the U.S. military
discretion to detain and try all Guantdnamo captives without regard
for the specific legal obligations of the Geneva Conventions, while
during an international armed conflict, are presumptively entitled to POW status
until given the hearings mandated by Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention.
Press Release, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva Convention on
Prisoners of War (Feb. 9, 2002), available at http://www.icrc.org (last visited Sept. 20,
2002). The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights called for precautionary
measures on March 12, 2002, requesting that the United States provide Article 5
hearings without delay for the Guantinamo captives. John Mintz, U.S. Told to Rule
on Detainees' Status, WASH. POST, Mar. 14,2002, at A12.
57. Fact Sheet, supra note 7.
58. See generally HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1947). The "declaratory" view ties legal existence to existence in fact, reducing
recognition to a political act leading to the establishment of diplomatic relations
between the recognized state and the state granting recognition. Id. at 41-42. The
"constitutive" view, on the other hand, ties the legal existence of new states to the
conferral of recognition by existing states. Id. at 38.
59. Id.
60. Fact Sheet, supra note 7.
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extending to them "many POW privileges as a matter of policy."61
The most pertinent aspects of POW treatment are exemption from
punishment for lawful acts of war; humane treatment; limits on
interrogation; trial rights equivalent to those afforded soldiers of the
detaining power; housing equivalent to soldiers of the detaining
power; and repatriation at the conclusion of active hostilities, unless
the POW has been charged with or convicted of crimes under
criminal processes consistent with the Convention.62 These are
significant international legal constraints, designed to operate
extraterritorially.
The duration of the asserted international armed conflict with
the Taliban is uncertain. In announcing the procedures for the
military commissions in March 2002, the counsel for the Department
of Defense stated that "the conflict is still going and we don't see an
end in sight right now."63 However, it was unclear whether he was
referring to the conflict in Afghanistan or the global "War Against
Terrorism." The consequences for the Afghan conflict of U.S.
recognition of the interim government headed by Hamid Karzai in
December 2001, following the defeat of the Taliban as a governing
entity, are also difficult to ascertain. While the POW policy suggests
that the United States has engaged in an international armed conflict
with the defeated Taliban regime, the United States is not at war with
the state of Afghanistan, whose recognized head of government sat as
honored guest at the President's January 2002 State of the Union
Address.
The United States eschews the role of occupying power in
Afghanistan. Occupying powers temporarily displace the government
of a defeated state and assume the role of the post-Westphalian
sovereign within that territory. Their capacities include the
establishment of an ad hoc judiciary and the exercise of law
enforcement authority. While the United States maintains control
over some prisoners in Afghanistan, it seems not to envision the
establishment of military commissions there.
While the Guantdnamo base reportedly remains the most likely
trial site, the Bush Administration apparently seeks the locale most
secure from oversight by the independent U.S. judiciary, which might
61. Id.
62. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 51, arts. 13-32, 82-88, 99-108, 118-119.
63. Katherine Q. Seelye, Pentagon Says Acquittals May Not Free Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22,2002, at A13 (quoting William J. Haynes II).
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question the jurisdiction of the commissions and provide protection
for the captives' legal rights.' These officials apparently do not
blanch at the image of the United States-the constitutional
democracy that pioneered the separation of powers-searching the
world for a trial site that law and independent judges cannot reach.
As the United States continues to engage in military actions
intended to kill or arrest Taliban and Al Qaeda suspects in Afghan
territory, it does so with the formal consent of the interim Afghan
government. The recognition of the Karzai government, under the
U.N. Charter system, implicates the fundamental norm of exclusive
territorial control over law enforcement that is an aspect of both the
non-interference principle of Article 2(7) and the prohibition on the
use of force expressed in Article 2(4). The legitimacy of U.S. military
and law enforcement operations in Afghanistan following recognition
of the Karzai government rests upon the accepted theory that a post-
Westphalian sovereign may, despite the principle of exclusive
territorial control, cede portions of authority to external entities,
including other states.65 U.S. forces have committed grievous errors
affecting Karzai loyalists and civilians.' A significant asymmetry of
power exists between the United States and the insecure new
government in Afghanistan, leaving U.S. forces free to operate
despite these tragic mistakes. A similar asymmetry of power between
the United States and Cuba explains the ability of the United States
to engage in a semblance of penal authority in Guantdnamo.
Because the Taliban leadership was closely linked to Al Qaeda,
the capture of members of the latter could be seen as an aspect of the
defeat of the Taliban. Indeed, Al Qaeda fighters might be regarded
64. See Katherine Q. Seelye, Government Sets Rules for Military on War
Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at Al:
Some administration officials said a likely setting for the trials would be the
United States Naval Station at Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, because they would
be shielded from the jurisdiction of United States courts.
But that view is not a legal certainty, and the administration is wrestling with
finding a locale that would afford the military the most control and prevent
the federal courts from intervening in death penalty cases.
Id.
65. See KRASNER, supra note 2, at 73.
66. See John Kifner, A Question for Afghanistan: Who's the Proxy Here?, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, at WK3; John F. Burns, U.S. Leapt Before Looking, Angry
Villagers Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, at FD18; Amy Waldman, After Mixup,
Americans Free 12 Afghans Suspected of Being Iranian Agents, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
2002, at A18.
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as "[m]embers of... militias and ... other volunteer corps, including
those of organized resistance movements," eligible for POW
treatment under the Third Geneva Convention because of their
capture while engaged in hostilities.6
However, the Military Order is not limited or even primarily
directed at the armed conflict in Afghanistan. The Bush
Administration has begun to transfer prisoners to Guantdnamo who
were not captured in Afghanistan and who had no involvement in the
conflict there. The President referred proudly in his State of the
Union Address to the six Algerians seized in Bosnia and transferred,
in disregard of extradition rules, in January 2002f The November 13
Order appears designed to permit the President to bypass the
ordinary criminal processes with respect to a wide range of persons
suspected of terrorist acts or plots unrelated to the events of
September 11 and the ensuing military action in Afghanistan. The
"War Against Terrorism" is both global and indefinite. The criteria
for declaring "victory" over international terrorism are unimaginable
and unrelated to ordinary standards for determining the termination
of hostilities in international armed conflict.
Given the territorial nature of the post-Westphalian state system
and Al Qaeda's non-territorial identity, retaliation against Al Qaeda
by the United States necessarily takes place in the territory of some
state. In the case of Afghanistan, the de facto Taliban government
essentially got swept into a conflict whose primary target was the Al
Qaeda network.
How far the United States intends to pursue this armed conflict
into the territory of non-consenting states and against additional
terrorist groups is a question of grave moment. As the "War Against
Terrorism" extends its reach, and suspected terrorists seized outside
Afghanistan are transported to Guantdnamo for indefinite detention
or military trial, the international community's tolerance of the
Administration's expansive war rhetoric will be tested. Terrorist
suspects seized outside the context of the conflict in Afghanistan will
likely present less plausible claims for treatment consistent with the
Geneva Conventions. The Bush Administration has already begun to
disseminate the view that the "War Against Terrorism" is an
emergency justifying indefinite executive detention without judicial
67. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 51, art. 4(A)(2).
68. Union Address, supra note 55.
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oversight.69
B. Internal Armed Conflict
The distinction between international armed conflict and internal
armed conflict is significant, as each type of conflict brings into
application a different set of conventional and customary legal norms.
Perhaps of greatest significance for persons captured during armed
conflict are the lack of immunity for lawful acts of war for insurgents
in internal armed conflict, and the denial of POW status. While
conduct during the conflict is governed by the norms of humanitarian
law that pertain to internal armed conflict, insurgents may be
subjected to the ordinary criminal laws for their acts of rebellion.
However, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
requires that any trials must be by "a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples."7
The definition of internal armed conflict is territorial, in the
sense that internal conflict is contained within a single state and
involves the government of that state and insurgents aspiring to
sovereignty over all or a portion of its territory. Internal armed
conflict must also be distinguished from isolated acts of violence and
internal disorders, and Protocol II draws this distinction primarily on
a territorial basis, recognizing armed conflict only where the non-state
forces have effective control of a portion of the national territory."
69. See John Mintz, U.S. Adds Legal Rights in Tribunals, WASH. POST, Mar. 21,
2002, at Al:
U.S. officials will rely in part on decisions by European human rights courts
that allowed British authorities to detain Irish Catholic and Protestant
militants for long periods of time if they were deemed dangerous but not
necessarily guilty of a crime, sources said. Those courts allowed the
detentions as long as British officials periodically reviewed the cases.
International law allows for such indefinite detention only in cases of
national emergency, and administration attorneys view the current
situation-with a danger of clandestine terrorists possibly wielding weapons
of mass destruction-as exactly that, legal sources said.
"In a state of real emergency, various liberties can be suspended," said one
attorney who advised the administration on the rules.
Id.
70. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 51, art. 3.
71. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
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Internal armed conflict may not appear to have much bearing on
the November 13 Order. While the United States employed military
commissions as martial law courts during its Civil War, it does not
claim that the September 11 attacks launched an internal armed
conflict in the United States of a magnitude that has disabled the
ordinary criminal courts from functioning.' Despite the massiveness
of the September 11 attacks, Al Qaeda's presence in the United
States is insufficient to satisfy the criteria for an internal armed
conflict as defined in international law.
However, the U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan can be
viewed as occurring in the context of that state's quarter-century old
internal armed conflict. The U.S. military battled the Taliban not
alone but with the assistance of the Northern Alliance, the armed
wing of the de jure government, as well as other anti-Taliban Afghan
forces. Once the Taliban was defeated, the United States continued
to conduct military operations with the formal consent of the interim
government, to which power was peacefully transferred in December
2001 by the former de jure government. The United States promptly
extended formal recognition and full diplomatic relations to the
Karzai government.
Thus, U.S. military action in Afghanistan is different in degree
rather than in kind from U.S. military assistance to other
governments engaged in internal armed conflict with terrorist groups,
such as the Philippines and Colombia. Because the United States is
not an occupying power in any of the states to whom it has extended
anti-terrorist military assistance, including Afghanistan, it may not
establish autonomous military commissions in the territories of these
states to try persons suspected of war crimes, acts of terrorism, or
common crimes. Those states may permit the United States to
engage in law enforcement authority within their territory, may
transfer terrorist suspects to the United States, and may even choose
to accept U.S. assistance in the establishment of criminal tribunals.
The notion that the United States is engaged in an international
armed conflict in the Philippines, for example, seems implausible.
President Bush's State of the Union Address, however, includes such
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict (Protocol
II), June 8, 1977, art. 1(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
72. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 1 (1866), establishes the principle that military
commissions may not try civilians during civil war where the regular federal criminal
courts are capable of functioning.
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law enforcement and military cooperation in the description of the
continuing "War Against Terrorism."73 It remains to be seen if the
Bush Administration will follow the logic of its rhetoric and transfer
to Guantdnamo captives seized in other internal armed conflicts.
Mf. Territorial Aspects of the Rule of Law
The November 13 Order and the detention policy implemented
at Guantdnamo raise a compelling question-is there a physical space
in the world today where the treatment of prisoners by the United
States is ungoverned by any legal rules? The text of the November 13
Order suggests that geography is irrelevant, as the detentions and
military commissions are purportedly authorized both inside and
outside U.S. territory. However, the selection of Guantinamo as a
detention/interrogation site and a possible venue for the military
commissions is far from accidental. The dominant concern of U.S.
authorities appears to be escape from constitutional constraints on
the treatment of terrorist suspects. That escape is better guaranteed
in a location beyond the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the politically
independent federal judiciary.
There are three bodies of law whose application U.S. authorities
must avoid if indefinite detention and trial by military commission are
to succeed pursuant to the November 13 Order. First, the provisions
of the United States Constitution relating to the establishment of
lower federal courts, indefinite preventive detention, and the rights of
criminal suspects must be interpreted as being inapplicable, or
constitutional scrutiny must simply be avoided altogether. The
applicability of constitutional norms is addressed below in Section
III.A. Second, humanitarian law limits on detention and trial of
captured combatants must be avoided. The applicability of the
Geneva Conventions has been addressed above in Section II, and
humanitarian law will not be examined further in this essay. Third,
human rights prohibitions on arbitrary detention and guarantees of
fair trial rights must be found inapplicable, either through a
derogation claim, a narrow jurisdictional theory relating to
extraterritoriality, or simply by ignoring international obligations.
Human rights norms and the potential availability of a forum to test
the Bush Administration's policy against human rights treaty and
customary norms are addressed in Section III.B.
73. Union Address, supra note 55.
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the Philippines, at the time an unincorporated territory of the United
States, and the defendant was a high-ranking Japanese general
accused of command responsibility for serious violations of the laws
of war. Johnson v. Eisentrager is especially interesting because the
military commission operated in China, with the consent of the
Chinese government, and because the Supreme Court refused to
exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction to examine the legal basis for the
commission trials, as it had in the two previous cases.
This trio of cases exempted military commissions from the
provisions of the Bill of Rights on the theory that alien enemy
combatants charged with violations of the law of war during
international armed conflict are subject to a special legal regime. This
regime was derived from the law of nations as it then existed. Indeed,
the three opinions are noteworthy for their extensive discussions of
customary international law, Congress's constitutional role in
implementing the laws of war pursuant to the "define and punish"
clause' 8 and the Court's own responsibility to implement the law of
nations as part of the law of the United States.
The November 13 Order poses separation of powers issues not
raised by the commissions established during the Second World
War-in particular, the Executive's usurpation of Congress's power
to establish the lower federal courts. 9 The claim that the President's
authority as Commander in Chief justifies the creation of a parallel
criminal justice system and a scheme of indefinite detention is
dubious at best, and unsustainable especially in the absence of a
legally cognizable international armed conflict.
Whatever the nature of the current "war," one thing is clear-
there are no "alien enemies." Since 1798 Congress has defined "alien
enemies" as "natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of [a] hostile
nation or government" with which the United States is engaged in a
"declared war."'  Even if the armed conflict underlying the
November 13 Order is narrowly conceived as an international armed
conflict with the Taliban, the absence of a declaration of war means
that no Afghan citizens or other subjects of the Taliban may be
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
79. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (conferring power on Congress to "constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court"); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").
80. 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2002).
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A. The Constitution
This essay will not examine the entire range of constitutional
issues implicated by the November 13 Order. Rather, the key
precedents concerning the constitutionality of trial by military
commission will be analyzed for their relevance to the November 13
Order, with an eye especially to territorial elements. It should be
emphasized that, should the November 13 Order produce primarily a
program of indefinite detention without charge or trial, the existing
precedents will have little bearing on its constitutionality.
Remarkably, the Bush Administration announced in March 2002 its
intent to detain indefinitely even captives who have been acquitted by
military commissions, if the Pentagon regards those persons as
dangerous.' Officials also indicated that only a handful of the
hundreds of captives are likely to be tried.' The prospect of
indefinite detention during the "War Against Terrorism" implicates
the highly controversial precedents relating to wartime internment of
persons of Japanese nationality or descent, including thousands of
U.S. citizens as well as South Americans deported to the United
States for detention.
The Bush Administration relies on three cases in which the
Supreme Court refused to invalidate convictions by military
commission: Ex parte Quirin, In re Yamashita, and Johnson v.
Eisentrager.77 In all three cases, defendants were enemy combatants
captured in the course of declared international wars, and were
accused and convicted of violations of the laws of war.
The geography of this trio of cases is notably diverse, suggesting
that status (enemy alien combatant) was the driving factor in the
constitutional exceptionality of these cases, rather than the territory
in which the commissions operated. The commission in Quirin
operated in the territory of the United States, one defendant claimed
to be a dual U.S.-German national, and all were German combatants
who had discarded their uniforms in order to commit acts of sabotage
within the United States. The commission in Yamashita operated in
74. Seelye, supra note 63 (quoting Pentagon officials William J. Haynes II &
Douglas Feith).
75. Id.
76. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see Natsu Taylor Saito,
Justice Held Hostage: U.S. Disregard for International Law in the World War I
Internment of Japanese Peruvians-A Case Study, 40 B.C.L. REV. 275 (1998).
77. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946);
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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treated as alien enemies. Al Qaeda, of course, has no "citizens."
The selective disfavored treatment of alien enemies in
international and U.S. law rests upon concepts rooted in the
territorial aspects of post-Westphalian sovereignty. The presence of
alien enemies, even civilians who are lawful permanent residents, in
the national territory during armed conflict poses a danger to be
managed by special measures of expulsion and internment. Alien
enemies are identifiable by their citizenship, not by personal conduct
or their attitudes toward their host state.1 They are subject to
summary expulsion and internment, which derogate from normal
constitutional protections for aliens present in the United States.
Trials by military commission and detentions under the
November 13 Order are limited to non-citizens, but, unlike policies of
expulsion and internment of alien enemies, these policies are not
directed at persons of a particular foreign nationality. In general,
non-citizens subjected to federal criminal justice are entitled to the
same constitutional rights as citizens, especially with respect to the
important structural protections that interpose juries and
independent judges between the suspect and the accusing executive:
[In relation to] the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, it must be
concluded that all persons within the territory of the United States
are entitled to the protection guaranteed by those amendments,
and that even aliens shall not be held to answer for a capital or
other infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
grand jury, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law."
Wong Wing v. United States leaves open the question whether the
Executive may deny grand jury indictment, jury trial, and trial before
politically independent Article III judges to non-citizens tried in
offshore detention camps, and whether the Due Process Clause
protects the Guantinamo captives against indefinite detention
without trial or after acquittal.
The special constitutional treatment of alien enemies applies
only during declared international armed conflicts. As Justice Black
stressed:
[T]he Alien Enemy Act of 1798 was intended to grant its
extraordinary powers only to prevent alien enemies residing in the
81. See J. Gregory Sidak, War, Liberty, and Enemy Aliens, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rav.
1402 (1992).
82. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,238 (1896).
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United States from extending aid and comfort to an enemy country
while dangers from actual fighting hostilities were imminently
threatened....
The 1798 Act did not grant its extraordinary and dangerous powers
to be used during the period of fictional wars. 3
Terrorist suspects, who may be of any nationality and who lack a
legal tie of citizenship to their alleged organization, are not easily
analogized to alien enemies. They may be guilty of crimes against the
United States, indeed of crimes severe enough to imperil national
security. But they are not alien enemies accused of violations of the
laws of war in a declared international armed conflict, as were the
defendants in the three cases from the Second World War that
validated the use of military commissions.
It is far from clear that war crimes, understood in an
international legal sense, will be the focus of any prosecutions
mounted pursuant to the November 13 Order. Terrorist offenses,
past and planned, are the chief preoccupation of the Bush
Administration's defensive strategy. The two important Supreme
Court precedents that invalidated convictions by military
commissions involved noncombatants who were neither enemy aliens
nor accused of violations of the laws of war.'
Johnson v. Eisentrager deserves special attention because it is
sometimes cited for the proposition that the Constitution has no
extraterritorial application. The location of the detention and
interrogation facility at Guantinamo and the decision to forego
83. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 177-78 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting).
84. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 1 (1866), involved the prosecution of a U.S. citizen
for anti-Union speech in Indiana during the Civil War. The Court invalidated
Milligan's conviction on the ground that the Constitution does not authorize
emergency powers that dispense with Article III and the Bill of Rights where the war
has not disabled the federal courts from functioning. Thus, Milligan might accept the
operation of military commissions where they fill a legal vacuum created by armed
conflict. No such vacuum exists in relation to crimes that might be prosecuted by
military commissions established under the November 13 Order.
Duncan v. Kohanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946), decided at roughly the same time
as Yamashita, invalidated convictions by military commissions operating in Hawaii
during Second World War. Hawaii was an incorporated territory of the United
States, but located within the "theater of war" in the Pacific. The decision by the
military commander to subject civilians accused of ordinary crimes to trial by military
commission was invalidated on a theory similar to that of Milligan: the continued
availability of the federal courts to try the same crimes. The citizenship status of the
defendants is not mentioned in the Court's opinion.
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establishment of military commissions inside the United States may
have been motivated by an understanding that the Bill of Rights
would provide no extraterritorial protection to persons subjected to
the November 13 Order. But the reasoning of Johnson v. Eisentrager
turns as greatly on the defendants' status as alien enemies accused of
war crimes as it does on the fact that their trial occurred in China and
their sentences were being served in Germany.
Gerald Neuman has elucidated two centuries of confused
doctrine relating to the territorial dimension of constitutional
protection, especially for persons suspected of crimes.85 Neuman
explains the difficulty the Framers' generation had with the
applicability of the Constitution to court proceedings conducted
outside the territory of the original thirteen states.' As the United
States became an imperial power, with sovereignty over non-white
subjects outside the territory of admitted states, theories suggested
that law enforcement and judicial power could be exercised by U.S.
officials in disregard of the Bill of Rights. Even citizens tried abroad,
for example by consular courts, might not enjoy the protection of the
Bill of Rights.' As Neuman observes, Justice Field's opinion in the
leading case of In re Ross emphasizes his view of the territorial limits
of the Constitution.' Field held that a U.S. consular court sitting in
Japan must, consistently with principles of comity, operate "on such
conditions as the two countries may agree, the laws of neither one
being obligatory upon the other."9
The Insular cases, which date from the era of Guantdnamo's
acquisition, divided the Supreme Court between Chief Justice White,
who "maintained the Constitution as the measure of federal power
over territories supposedly designated by Congress as welcome to full
status, but limited protection in other territories to a minimal set of
background rights described as fundamental," and the first Justice
85. See Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L. J. 909 (1991).
86. See id. at 943-56.
87. Id. at 956-64.
88. Neuman observes:
The language of the argument came from the conflict of laws and
emphasized the primacy of territorial sovereignty as the basis of legal
obligation. Japan as a sovereign nation had the ultimate right to forbid the
consul to conduct a jury trial within its territory; therefore the Constitution
was not legally binding on the consul.
Id. at 957.
89. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453,464 (1891).
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Harlan, who "continued the traditional insistence that wherever
Congress acquired sovereignty, the rights of the written Constitution
followed as part of the fundamental law." In Neuman's terms,
"municipal law" theorists such as Justice Harlan asserted that the
Constitution followed the flag. The projection of sovereignty over
territories carried with it the constraints of the Constitution. Harlan,
however, suggested that temporary military occupation of foreign
territory with no objective of acquiring sovereignty would not extend
the protection of the Constitution9'
Reid v. Covert,92 decided after Johnson v. Eisentrager, extends
full constitutional protection to the extraterritorial military trial of a
civilian not charged with war crimes. In that case, however, the
defendant possessed U.S. citizenship. There is little case law
following Reid that casts light on the constitutional theories examined
by Neuman and their potential applicability to the military
commissions proposed in the November 13 Order.93 As Neuman
summarizes:
As the Bill of Rights expanded under the Warren Court and the
early Burger Court, lower courts read Reid v. Covert broadly as
confirming citizens' rights against federal action on the high seas
and in foreign countries. A substantial body of criminal procedure
cases resulted, as well as occasional noncriminal cases. Some courts
were hesitant to deny similar protection to aliens abroad, and two
well-known holdings boldly provided such protection.94
The Supreme Court in 1990, however, suggested that certain
provisions of the Bill of Rights, such as the warrant clause of the
Fourth Amendment, have no extraterritorial application to non-
citizens, even those later subjected to regular federal criminal trials.95
In its character as a program of indefinite preventive detention,
the November 13 Order is highly questionable under the Due Process
Clause. The analogy to wartime internment of prisoners of war and
90. Neuman, supra note 85, at 958.
91. Id. at 963 (discussing Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901), which involved
extradition of a U.S. citizen to Cuba to stand trial before a military tribunal
established by occupying General Leonard Wood).
92. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
93. United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. for Berlin 1979), suggests that
the Reid principle does extend to non-citizens subjected to U.S. military trial for
terrorist offenses.
94. Neuman, supra note 85, at 970 (citations omitted).
95. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
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civilians seems strained, in light of the global scope of the "War
Against Terrorism" and the impossibility of determining the warring
parties and the duration of "hostilities." The Order purports to
authorize the indefinite preventive detention of terrorist suspects
arrested anywhere in the world, for an unspecified period of time, and
without judicial supervision.
The Supreme Court in the recent Zadvydas v. Davis decision
applied full due process protection to deportable but non-removable
aliens held in indefinite preventive detention, and confirmed the
appropriateness of habeas corpus relief to supervise executive
detention policies. 6 The Court stressed the physical presence of the
detainees in the territory of the United States, however:
It is well established that certain constitutional protections
available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to
aliens outside of our geographic borders [citing United Sates v.
Verdugo-Urquidez and Johnson v. Eisentrager]. But once an alien
enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due
Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States,
including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent.97
In dismissing a habeas corpus petition filed on behalf of
unnamed Guantdinamo captives, a federal district court in Los
Angeles relied on precedent suggesting that Haitian and Cuban
asylum-seekers previously detained on Guantdnamo were not subject
to the "sovereignty" of the United States and thus could not protect
their right to liberty by invoking the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the
federal courts.98 The District Court cautioned that "nothing in this
ruling suggests that the captives are entitled to no legal protection
whatsoever."' Yet, without a forum in which to adjudicate their legal
rights, the Guantdnamo captives are left to the mercy of unfettered
executive discretion.
Litigation brought on behalf of British and Australian captives
may clarify whether the most fundamental aspect of Due Process,
derived from the Magna Carta-right to judicial determination of the
96. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
97. Id. at 693.
98. Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1049 (2002) (citing Cuban
Am. Bar Assoc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1425 (11th Cir. 1995)). The asylum-
seekers, unlike the current captives, however, had the "key to the jailhouse door" in
that they could escape confinement by accepting repatriation.
99. Id.
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lawfulness of executive detention-protects persons subjected to the
power of American law enforcement in anomalous offshore prison
facilities."° Venue is claimed in the District of Columbia, on the basis
that President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, who oversee
the military commanders of Camp Delta on Guantdnamo, are located
and are making relevant policies there.
B. Human Rights Law
The suggestion that any human being is without legal rights,
when detained and threatened with criminal prosecution and
punishment, poses a stark challenge to universal human rights
principles. The concept of universal human rights is antithetical to
the status and geographic distinctions that cause the protection of
humanitarian law and the Constitution to be variable and
unpredictable.
The November 13 Order primarily implicates three sets of
human rights: the prohibition on arbitrary detention; the right to fair
trial; and the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment or punishment. The United States is a party to
two relevant treaties,"' is subject to the supervision of a regional
human rights body in the Americas (the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights), and is also bound by customary international
human rights norms relating to these rights. I will not explicate these
rights at length in this essay. While the issue of arbitrary detention is
fairly well framed on the basis of information available as of March
2002, additional facts are necessary in order to assess whether torture
or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment is being inflicted on the
captives. The question of fair trial rights requires an analysis of
whether the derogation from ordinary procedures in the federal
criminal courts made by the Department of Defense regulations, most
significantly in relation to the denial of appeal to an independent
judicial body and the admission of hearsay evidence, is taking place in
the context of an emergency that threatens the life of the nation and
whether the derogation measures are strictly required by the
100. Rasul v. Bush, No. 02-299, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14031 (D.D.C. July 30,
2002); Philip Shenon, Suit to Be Filed on Behalf of Three Detainees in Cuba, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 19,2002, at A10.
101. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
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exigencies of the circumstances.
The three bodies of law (Constitution, humanitarian law, and
human rights law) vary in interesting ways in relation to geography
and the ability of military captives to claim rights. The theory of the
November 13 Order appears to be that the existence of an armed
conflict confers authority on the President to establish by fiat a
specialized criminal justice system, not subject to constitutional
constraint or judicial scrutiny. The President may designate certain
persons to be detained and/or tried in this system of his creation, and
they may not claim any protection under the Constitution. Operating
this system outside the territory of the United States, but in a location
where full sovereign power can be exercised over the captives, further
insulates the President's actions from constitutional limits because of
the uncertain geographic scope of habeas corpus relief. Thus, the
claimed armed conflict and the extraterritorial location of the captives
combine to make the Constitution essentially disappear as a source of
legal rights.
Humanitarian law, in contrast, springs into application when an
armed conflict comes into existence. The November 13 Order
appears to have been crafted primarily to escape from the
Constitution, with little thought given to the consequence that armed
conflict would subject the President's treatment of the captives to the
external constraints of the Geneva Conventions. The confusion and
disagreement within the Bush Administration over the POW status of
the captives perhaps results from this inattention. The POW
controversy has helped illuminate the ambiguous character of the
"War Against Terrorism" and has exposed the United States to
international criticism for its disregard of important international
legal protections for persons detained in the course of combat. The
President has denied the captives the most important protections of
the Geneva Conventions-trial rights and housing equivalent to that
afforded soldiers of the detaining power and repatriation at the
conclusion of hostilities. Their standards of treatment are determined
by "policy" rather than law, and subject to unfettered executive
discretion.
Human rights law neither disappears nor springs into application
with armed conflict. The danger that human rights protections might
be suspended by warring states was contemplated by the drafters of
human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights ("ICCPR"). The derogation clause in Article 4
of the ICCPR governs the circumstances under which human rights
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protections may be suspended or varied to accommodate emergencies
that threaten the life of the nation, whether caused by war, terrorism,
or other extraordinary situations."l Certain rights, such as protection
against torture and cruel or degrading treatment, are non-derogable.
The derogation jurisprudence of human rights treaty bodies has
yielded a principle that the right to seek a judicial determination of
the lawfulness of detention also cannot be suspended." Emergency
rules implicating arbitrary detention and fair trial rights are subject to
searching evaluation to assess whether the suspension of rights is
proportional to the exigencies of the emergency situation. All
persons subject to detention are protected by these norms, without
the status limitations that affect the applicability of the Constitution
or humanitarian law.
Derogating states do not typically establish offshore detention
and trial facilities for terrorist suspects. Thus, the November 13
Order poses a distinct set of issues that have not been thoroughly
examined by human rights treaty bodies, even though lengthy
detention without charge and military trials of terrorist suspects are a
well-known phenomenon in derogation jurisprudence. Is there a
variable geography to fundamental human rights?
The United States obtained a ruling from the Supreme Court
that the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees placed no
constraint upon the Executive's treatment of refugees outside the
territory of the United States, leaving the Executive free to interdict
asylum-seekers on the high seas and return them directly to the state
102. For a more detailed explanation of Article 4 as it applies to the establishment
of military commissions pursuant to the November 13 Order, see Fitzpatrick, supra
note 8.
103. A recent articulation of this principle is included in the Human Rights
Committee's interpretation of Article 4 issued in August 2001. Human Rights
Committee, General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001). Within the Inter-American system, a highly
evolved body of jurisprudence has developed regarding the non-derogability of
judicial guarantees to challenge the lawfulness of detention and strictly limiting the
period of incommunicado detention. See, e.g., Habeas Corpus in Emergency
Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) of the American Convention on Human
Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 (1987); Judicial Guarantees in States of
Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights),
Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 (1987); Castillo Petruzzi Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
Judgment of May 30, 1999, Series C, No. 52, reprinted in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTs 1999, OEA/Ser.L.IV/III.47, doc. 6, at
app. IX (2000).
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in which they feared persecution."N Can a similar theory of
geographic inapplicability be argued in relation to the ICCPR and the
Convention Against Torture ("CAT")?
The language of the treaties is likely to be seized upon by the
Administration to argue that these instruments do not govern its
treatment of the Guantdinamo captives. Article 2(1) of the ICCPR
requires a state party to protect the defined rights of "all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction."'' 5 Article 2(1) of
the CAT requires a state party to prohibit "acts of torture in any
territory under its jurisdiction."'' 6  The decision by the European
Court of Human Rights that persons affected by NATO bombing in
Belgrade in 1999 could not file an application under the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms suggests that human rights treaties may have a confined
jurisdiction ratione lociY
However, the human rights treaty bodies, including the
European Court of Human Rights in the Bankovic v. Belgium case,
recognize that where a state party projects its sovereignty outside its
own territory to detain persons, its actions are subject to human rights
treaty provisions."° The United States, by the terms of its lease with
Cuba, exercises "complete jurisdiction and control" of the
Guantdnamo base.1"9  The captives are held in close and harsh
confinement, every detail of their existence supervised by U.S.
104. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
105. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 101, art. 2(1).
106. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, supra note 101, art. 2(1).
107. Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, Decision on Admissibility (Dec. 12,
2001), available at http://xvwv.echr.coe.int (last visited Oct. 19, 2002).
108. Id. at paras. 23, 26, 67-73. The respondent states argued that:
The exercise of 'jurisdiction' therefore involves the assertion or exercise of
legal authority, actual or purported, over persons owing some form of
allegiance to that State or who have been brought within that State's
control....
[T]he Court... has applied this notion of jurisdiction to confirm that certain
individuals affected by acts of a respondent State outside of its territory can
be considered to fall within its jurisdiction because there was an exercise of
some form of legal authority by the relevant State over them. The arrest and
detention of the applicants outside the territory of the respondent State...
constituted, according to the Governments, a classic exercise of such legal
authority or jurisdiction over those persons by military forces on foreign soil.
Id. at paras. 36-37.
109. Coaling and Naval Stations Lease, supra note 28.
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officials.
Where a state is operating extraterritorially, and is subjecting
individuals to its law enforcement authority, the state must adhere to
its human rights treaty obligations, including the prohibitions on
torture and arbitrary detention. During the "dirty wars" in South
America, for example, foreign security forces were sometimes
permitted to detain, torture, and disappear "terrorist" suspects in the
territory of allied dictatorships. This exercise of extraterritorial law
enforcement brought the victims within the jurisdiction of the state
committing the human rights violations. As the Human Rights
Committee stated in such a case, the reference to territory and
jurisdiction in Article 2(1) of the ICCPR:
does not imply that the State Party concerned cannot be held
accountable for violations of rights under the Covenant which its
agents commit upon the territory of another State, whether with
the acquiescence of the Government of that State or in opposition
to it.... [I]t would be unconscionable to so interpret the
responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State
party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of
another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own
territory.1 °
This leaves the question of a forum for assessing the consistency
of U.S. policy regarding the Guantdnamo captives with the nation's
human rights obligations. The United States does not accept the right
of individual communication under the ICCPR, although it has
accepted the optional interstate complaint mechanism under Article
41. No state has ever brought a complaint against another state
before the Human Rights Committee. The Human Rights
Committee may also review state reports, including special reports
that have sometimes been requested from states facing emergencies,
pursuant to Article 40. The United States has generally ignored the
rulings of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
("IACHR"), which has authority to consider individual
communications regarding states that are members of the
Organization of American States but which have not ratified the
American Convention on Human Rights. The IACHR has already
received a communication concerning the treatment of the
110. L6pez Burgos v. Uruguay, Communication No. 52/1979, U.N. GAOR, 36th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, para. 12.3, at 182, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981).
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Guantdnamo captives."' If a U.S. court exercises habeas corpus
jurisdiction over the captives, their rights under treaties and
customary international law could be determined, as elements of the
"laws or treaties" of the United States.
112
IV. Conclusion
This essay has explored the intersection of sovereignty,
territoriality, and the rule of law, in relation to the unprecedented
policy of detention and potential military trial of suspected terrorists
subjected to the November 13 Military Order. First, the territorial
elements of post-Westphalian sovereignty have been sketched.
Specifically, this essay has examined the challenge posed to the state
system by non-territorial transnational criminal networks such as Al
Qaeda. The Bush Administration appears to regard the United
States as being engaged in an international armed conflict with Al
Qaeda and other global terrorist networks, although its
pronouncements regarding the "War Against Terrorism" remain
confused and contradictory. What is clear is that the Administration
believes that victory in this war requires the exercise of absolute
sovereignty without legal constraint over captured enemies.
Ironically, this rights-free zone of operation is more practically
available outside the sovereign's territory than within it.
Second, this essay examined the territorial assumptions of the
law of armed conflict. In particular, it emerges that international law
cannot accommodate the concept of an international armed conflict
between a state and a transnational terrorist network with no
territorial aspirations. Al Qaeda is unable, even if willing, to become
a party to the Geneva Conventions, not being a member of the club
of post-Westphalian states. Thus, the November 13 Order will
operate without legal constraints from international humanitarian
law, even though it is premised on the existence of armed conflict.
While the United States acknowledges the formal applicability 9f the
Geneva Conventions to its conflict with the Taliban, President Bush
has rejected the trial and detention rules set out in the Third Geneva
Convention for all of the Guantnamo captives.
111. Request by the Center for Constitutional Rights, the Human Rights Clinic at
Columbia Law School and the Center for Justice and International Law for
Precautionary Measures under Article 25 of the Commission's Regulations, Feb. 25,
2002 (on file with author).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2002).
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Third, this essay explored the territorial aspects of the
Constitution, as it relates to the implementation of the November 13
Order. Whether the Constitution follows the flag to Guantdnamo,
and whether judicial scrutiny of the detentions and potential military
trials will be available to the captives, are complex and unclear
questions.
Finally, the international human rights obligations of the United
States are substantively difficult to escape by the creation of offshore
detention facilities. These are universal norms, not variable based on
the status of the person detained. The Bush Administration is likely
to argue that the "War Against Terrorism" has created a state of
emergency that justifies derogation from detention and fair trial
provisions. It is also possible that the Administration will suggest
territorial limits on those universal obligations. Whether the
mechanisms designed for the implementation of human rights treaties
have sufficient authority to adjudicate authoritatively the lawfulness
of U.S. policy is a troubling and significant question for rights
defenders.
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